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Abstract 
Growing Euroscepticism across the European Union (EU) leaves open questions as to 
what citizens expect to gain from EU Membership and what influences their dissent 
for the EU integration project. This paper looks at EU Structural Funds, one of the 
largest and most visible expenditure items in the EU budget, to test the impact of EU 
money on electoral support for the EU. By leveraging the Referendum on Brexit hold in 
the United Kingdom, a spatial RDD analysis offers causal evidence that EU money does 
not influence citizens’ support for the EU. Conversely, the analysis shows that EU funds 
contribute to mitigate Euroscepticism only where they are coupled with tangible 
improvements in the local labour market conditions. In order to gain support from its 
citizens, the European Union needs to produce tangible impacts, generating 
opportunities at the local level where these are felt the most by voters. 
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It’s not about the money! 
EU funds, local opportunities, and the Brexit 
vote 
 
1. Introduction 
Anti-systemic political movements have emerged in recent years in a large number of 
countries across the globe. These parties generally fuel their public support with anti-
elites and anti-establishment rhetoric which in Europe often translates into a strong 
critique to the European Union (EU) and its institutions. The EU is regarded by the 
supporters of anti-system movements as distant from the real day-to-day economic 
challenges of the citizens and as a binding constraint to the capacity of national 
governments to deliver a more equitable distribution of prosperity. The inability of 
mainstream politics – of which the EU is seen as a natural expression – to deliver timely 
and credible answers to the economic needs of large strata of the electorate has been 
linked to electoral behaviour by a growing body of research (Rodrik, 2018; Colantone 
and Stanig, 2018; Rodriguez-Pose, 2018; Guiso et al., 2018; Dijkstra et al., 2019). 
However, it remains unclear how the concrete actions of the EU can practically make 
a difference to the economic prospects of millions of EU citizens and, through its 
visible impacts, influence their electoral preferences. Economic theory unveils a 
number of benefits from the the process of economic integration allowed for by the EU 
(Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2015). However, the majority of these benefits materialise 
through adjustments in prices and quantities that are difficult for citizens to link to EU 
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membership. Conversely, a set of concrete policy actions are intended to visibly and 
clearly impact the economic opportunities available to EU citizens. Among those the 
lion’s share of financial resources goes to regional development interventions under 
the EU Cohesion Policy (Begg, 2008; Bachtler 2017).  
While some evidence has been produced to show that financial disbursement through 
EU Cohesion funds is related to lower Eurosceptic feelings (Osterloh, 2011; Borin et 
al., 2018; Albanese et al., 2019), other studies are more critical of any direct voting 
impacts produced by European regional policy (Bachtrogler and Oberhofer, 2018; 
Fidmurc et al. 2019). This suggests that the role played by EU transfers for the 
development of pro-Europe attitudes is highly heterogeneous. What makes EU 
Cohesion resources spread ‘love’ for the European Union remains to be explored.  
Under what conditions (if at all) can EU Cohesion Policy influence support for the 
European Union? Is the capacity to deliver enhanced economic opportunities in the 
areas targeted by Cohesion Policy that pays off in the ballots? If the fundamental drive 
for anti-system votes rests on economic motivations, improvements in local economic 
conditions experienced by voters in beneficiary areas should – ceteris paribus – 
improve their preferences for EU integration. 
We address these research questions by focusing on the context offering arguably the 
most limpid case of democratic vote either in favour or against the European Union, 
the 2016 United Kingdom Referendum on EU membership. The Brexit vote represents 
the ideal setting to investigate the impact of EU funds on Euroscepticism, not only for 
the nature of the vote being explicitly and uniquely centred on the EU1, but also 
because in the UK some areas have received very large proportions of financial aid in 
the form of EU Structural Funds over the last years. In these places, voters at the 2016 
                                                   
1  While any election featuring Eurosceptic parties enables voters to express anti-EU 
preferences, what makes the Brexit Referendum unique is that all voters opting for ‘Leave’ – 
even if not explicitly driven by resentments against the EU – expressed a clear and 
unambiguously Eurosceptic choice. Differently, votes for anti-Europe parties at national 
elections may be completely unrelated with their Eurosceptic platform.   
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Referendum were not just choosing the future of their country within or outside the 
EU, but they were also expressing their preference on whether to retain EU financial 
support. 
The impact of EU policies on the Referendum results is estimated by adopting a 
boundary RDD methodology. We exploit the border between a region classified as ‘in 
highest need of financial help’ by the EU at the time of the vote, West Wales and The 
Valley, and a region receiving a much lower intensity of EU aid, East Wales. To 
investigate the presence of a causal link between Cohesion Policy and ‘Remain’ votes, 
we compare voting outcomes for micro-aggregated units (electoral wards) on the two 
sides of the border.  
Our results document that EU Cohesion funds help ‘spreading love’ for the EU only if 
citizens witness clear improvements in their living standards during the funding 
period. Public support for EU Membership is found to be more sustained in areas 
receiving higher shares of EU funds and – at the same time - witnessing larger 
improvements in local labour market conditions. Conversely, EU funding per se 
appears to be unable to systematically influence voting behaviour. 
We capture the economic dynamism of local areas in the pre-Brexit Referendum 
period through the decrease in the unemployment rate over the period in which the 
case-study region, West Wales and the Valley, has had access to the highest proportion 
of development funds from the EU. We find evidence that local areas receiving higher 
proportions of EU funds and displaying stronger dynamism in their labour market are 
comparatively more likely to vote in favour of remaining in the European Union.  
Therefore, in line with the literature assigning a key role to socio-economic dynamics 
in shaping Eurosceptic and populistic votes (Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Rodriguez-
Pose, 2018; Guiso et al., 2018), our evidence supports the idea that the economic 
dynamism of local areas mediates the role of EU Structural Funds for Eurosceptic 
preferences. Taken together, these results indicate that voting preferences of citizens 
EU funds, local opportunities, and the Brexit vote 
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are not responsive to financial assistance, but rather to tangible improvements in their 
daily life, such as new employment opportunities.  
This paper relates to different strands of literature. First, it contributes to the rich 
literature on the impact of Cohesion Policy (e.g. Becker et al., 2010; 2013; 2018), and 
more specifically the growing, yet still underexplored field of research linking EU 
funds with the public support for the European Union (e.g. Capello and Perucca, 2017; 
Bachtler and Mendez, 2017; Dellmuth and Chalmers, 2018; Bachtrogler and Oberhofer, 
2018; Borin et al., 2019; Fidrmuc et al, 2019). The mixed evidence emerging from these 
recent studies leaves the issue of whether areas receiving higher proportions of EU 
Structural Funds develop a more favourable of Europe because of EU financial help still 
unsolved. In addition, this literature is silent on whether the effect of EU funding on 
public support towards the EU materialises under key conditions in place in the 
territories where public investment through Cohesion Policy takes place. Our 
contribution aims to assess the impact of EU funds by adopting counterfactual 
methodologies allowing to uncover clear causal impacts: our focus on the UK context 
lends itself to this type of analysis due to the Referendum on EU membership held in 
the country in 2016. 
Besides contributing to the study of how Cohesion Policy may affect Euroscepticism, 
our analysis adds to the literature on the determinants of the Brexit vote. 
Understanding the reasons that brought the UK population to favour a ‘Leave’ vote 
has been the subject of many recent studies. Among the empirical works produced to 
analyse Brexit determinants (e.g. Hobolt and Wratil 2016; Scruton 2016; Clarke and 
Whittaker 2016; Harris and Charlton 2017), it is worth noting how several recent 
contributions have highlighted the primary role of economic conditions faced by 
voters to explain the Referendum result (Becker et al., 2016; Los et al., 2017; Crescenzi 
et al., 2018; Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Alabrese et al., 2019). As such, it may expected 
that EU policies – having enhanced the economic performance of UK poorer regions 
(Di Cataldo, 2017; Di Cataldo and Monastiriotis, 2019) – may influence the political 
preferences of voters as well. The works focusing specifically on the relationship 
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between EU funds and Brexit Referendum have obtained mixed results. They either 
report a significant association, suggesting that areas receiving more money from the 
EU have voted Remain more (Huggins, 2018) or report no significant relationship 
(Fidrmuc et al., 2019). These studies, however, are performed for relatively large 
aggregated units (NUTS3 or NUTS2 regions) and without attempting to identify 
causal impacts. In addition, the divergent results might suggest the omission of more 
fundamental local factors mediating the impact of EU funds on electoral support for 
the EU. 
More broadly, the paper speaks to the literature analysing the causes of anti-
establishment, extremist and populist votes, which has been booming in recent years 
(e.g. Barone et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2016; Algan et al., 2017; Halla et al., 2017; Guiso et 
al., 2017; Dustman et al., 2017; Boeri et al., 2018; Rodrik, 2018). The electoral victory of 
‘Leave’ supporters at the Brexit Referendum of 2016 is commonly regarded as one of 
the first signs of the recent anti-systemic and populistic wave characterising Western 
politics (De Jonge, 2017). To our knowledge, our paper is the first to specifically focus 
on the conditions under which public investment may shape electoral preferences for 
this kind of political offers.  
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses institutional 
background, case study and data; section 3 presents the empirical setting and the 
models; section 4 reports the empirical results; section 5 discusses and interprets the 
findings; section 6 concludes.  
2. Institutional background and data 
2.1 EU Cohesion Policy in the UK at the time of the Referendum on Brexit 
One third of the total budget of the European Union is spent within the EU Cohesion 
Policy. For the ongoing (2014-2020) programming period, the EU is spending on 
Cohesion Policy 352 billion euros, most of which is directed towards the economically 
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disadvantaged territories across the continent, i.e. the regions classified as ‘less 
developed’. Investment projects financed with these resources are intended to build 
new infrastructure, foster innovation, promote the development of businesses, 
generate employment opportunities and tackle social exclusion.  
In the UK, this investment policy has been extensively financing disadvantaged 
territories since the early 80s. Eligibility for EU funding is assigned to so-called 
‘NUTS2’2 regions before the beginning of each EU programming period, lasting seven 
years. During the ongoing 2014-2020 EU budget period, the UK regions classified as 
‘less developed’– and hence entitled to receive the highest form of EU financial 
support – were West Wales and the Valleys in Wales, and Cornwall and the Isles of 
Scilly in England (Figure 1). These two regions, the poorest of the country, are those 
with a regional GDP per capita below the 75% of the EU average (European 
Commission, 2010; 2014). Both of them have received the status of ‘less developed’ in 
the year 2000, and have been continuously financed by the EU via this funding scheme 
since then (Di Cataldo, 2017). Taken together, these regions account for less than 4% 
of the total UK population, yet they were entitled to receive around 26% of the total 
amount of total EU development funds allocated to the UK3 (European Commission, 
                                                   
2 The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) is a system used to 
divide the EU territory. The NUTS1 level represents major socio-economic areas, the NUTS2 
‘intermediate’ level is used for the application of EU Cohesion Policy, while the NUTS3 are 
smaller regions for specific diagnosis. 
3 In areas considered ‘in highest need of financial help’ by the EU and highly-financed through 
Cohesion Policy, EU funds represent a substantial portion of total public investment for 
development promotion. As an example, for the year 2014 West Wales and The Valley received 
around €290 million in EU funds, while the total EU expenditures in Wales (including East 
Wales) sum up to €305 million. The total UK Government capital expenditures for ‘Economic 
affairs’ (a spending category roughly corresponding with the main objectives of EU funds) in 
Wales during the same year amount to £845 million. Hence, about 30% of total capital 
investment in Wales have been made through Cohesion Policy, a percentage which is much 
higher if we only focus on West Wales and The Valley (UK Government spending data is not 
available for areas within Wales). Importantly, the logic through which public investment is 
made by the UK Government differs from the one adopted by the EU. The UK Government 
barely accounts for the initial level of poverty of a region. This is exemplified by the fact that 
expenditures for ‘Economic affairs’ in the richest region of the country, the London 
metropolitan area, is comparable to the entire amount invested in Wales (£711 per person and 
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2010; 2014). The remaining EU funds invested in the UK have been spread across all 
other regions of the country. 
 
Figure 1. 
EU funds in the UK at the time of the Referendum on Brexit 
 
 
Eligibility for EU funds to ‘less developed’ regions (units: NUTS2 regions). Red: ‘less developed regions’ 
during 2014-2020 EU programming period. 
For the 2014-2020 period, the UK is the second largest net contributor to the EU budget, 
after Germany. The difference between expenses towards the EU and received funds 
from Brussels amounts to around €10 billion (House of Commons, 2018). In light of 
this, it is not surprising that a recurring argument brought forward by proponents of 
Brexit during the Referendum campaign was that leaving the EU would save financial 
                                                   
£751 per person, respectively, in 2014). Hence, while in richer UK regions EU funds represent 
a small portion of total capital expenditures, in poorer areas the total investment for economic 
development would have been much lower in absence of Cohesion Policy (Data on UK 
Government spending retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-
expenditure-statistical-analyses-pesa).  
West Wales 
and The Valley 
Cornwall 
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resources to be spent on other priorities, such as financing the public healthcare 
system. Conversely, EU Cohesion Policy was barely mentioned during the campaign. 
The arguments used by Eurosceptic leaders, and the highly unequal distribution of EU 
funds across the country – with richer regions receiving little in per capita terms, and 
poorer regions receiving much more – implies that, in order to study the impact of 
Cohesion Policy on the Referendum’s outcome, it is worth centring the attention on 
areas where the investment from the EU truly represents a vital portion of total public 
investment. Moreover, the high degree of heterogeneity across the UK implies that 
empirical models trying to capture the effect of EU funds on Brexit by focusing on the 
entire country (e.g. Becker et al., 2017) may fail to account for key idiosyncratic and 
unobservable characteristics of highly-funded territories.  
2.2 Wales as a case-study 
The Welsh Nation is divided into two NUTS2 regions, East Wales and West Wales and 
The Valley, one of which is entitled to receive the highest form of EU aid4 . The 
geographical boundary between these two regions was set up in 1998, determining the 
regions’ eligibility for EU funding during the 2000-2006 programming period 
(Gripaios and Bishop, 2006). West Wales and The Valley has been considered a ‘less 
developed’ region by the EU for the first time in 2000, and has conserved that status 
until today. This has entitled the region to receive large portions of EU funds, equal to 
around €2 billion during each of the 2000-2006, 2007-2013, and 2014-2020 periods. In 
comparison, East Wales has been committed by the EU around €300m for each of the 
7-year periods.  
                                                   
4 Unlike in other European countries, in the UK NUTS2 regions are used exclusively for EU 
funding purposes, having no administrative or political meaning (Gripaios and Bishop, 2006). 
This makes local areas belonging to neighbouring NUTS2 regions more similar, as the regional 
boundaries are often unrelated to any social, political or cultural characteristics. 
Riccardo Crescenzi, Marco Di Cataldo, and Mara Giua 
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Geolocalised data on EU funds beneficiaries 5  for the 2007-2013 period allow to 
visualise the geographical distribution of EU development projects across Wales. 
Figure 2 shows that a very large portion of financial resources have been received and 
spent in the vicinity of the border between East and West Wales, on the Western side. 
The concentration of projects on the South-Eastern side of the boundary, clearly visible 
in Figure 2, corresponds to Cardiff, Wales’ capital. This city acts as ‘managing 
authority’ for all EU funds in the Welsh Nation, that is, it is responsible to receive funds 
from Brussels and redistribute them within Wales. While most of the beneficiary data 
records the location of their actual beneficiary, others are still registered with the 
Welsh Government Offices in Cardiff. Much of this money has likely been spent across 
Wales, mainly on the Western side6. However, given that we are unable to say what 
exact proportion of the funds officially recorded in Cardiff has been spent somewhere 
else, our estimates are performed both with and without Cardiff wards in the sample 
(cfr. Section 4.2) and our preferred specifications are the latter, i.e. excluding Cardiff. 
A clear discontinuity appears visible in Figure 2 in terms of EU resources spent on the 
two side of the border. A large share of the EU projects implemented in West Wales 
appear to be concentrated in the white area of Figure 2, i.e. less than 10 km away from 
the boundary separating the region from East Wales. This is confirmed in Table A1 in 
the Appendix, which shows the results of regressing the proportion of EU funds per 
capita on a dummy variable defining whether a ward belongs West Wales, and 
excluding Cardiff from the sample7. The positive and significant coefficient of the West 
                                                   
5 These data, kindly shared with us by Julia Bachtroegler, only cover approximately 60% of all 
total EU funds to Wales. The remaining 40% is either not recorded in the beneficiaries’ dataset, 
or are projects with no single beneficiary and distributed across many different locations. 
6  Some of the funds reporting the Welsh Government in Cardiff as beneficiary has been 
geocoded in the area where the money has been spent by exploiting the description of the 
projects. As an example, one of the largest project in the data is described as the ‘Dualling of the 
A465 between Tredegar and Brynmawr’. While this is officially recorded with the Welsh 
Government (Department for Economy, Science and Transport) as beneficiary, it was possible 
to locate the investment in West Wales, in the exact place where the A465 road is. 
7  Cardiff acts as ‘managing authority’ for all EU funds in the Welsh Nation, that is, it is 
responsible to receive funds from Brussels and redistribute them within Wales. While most of 
EU funds, local opportunities, and the Brexit vote 
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Wales dummy indicates that West Wales’ wards near the border have received and 
spent comparatively more EU funds than East Wales’ wards – approximately €400-500 
per inhabitant more, on the basis of 2007-2013 beneficiary data. 
 
Figure 2. 
Distance in km from treatment border and EU funds beneficiaries in Wales 
 Great Britain Wales 
   
Note: the dashed line indicates the border of Wales, the red thick continuous line indicates the treatment 
border between East Wales and West Wales. 
 
  
                                                   
the beneficiary data records the location of their actual beneficiary, others are still registered 
with the Welsh Government Offices in Cardiff. Much of this money has likely been spent across 
Wales, mainly on the Western side7. However, given that we are unable to say what exact 
proportion of the funds officially recorded in Cardiff has been spent somewhere else, our 
estimates are performed both with and without Cardiff wards in the sample and our preferred 
specifications are the latter, i.e. excluding Cardiff. 
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2.3 Data 
To measure Eurosceptic votes at the 2016 UK Referendum on Brexit we rely on unique 
data on the Referendum results at the level of electoral wards, made available to us by 
the BBC. This database has been compiled by the BBC by sending individual emails to 
all UK Constituencies after the Referendum was held, on the basis of the UK Freedom 
of Information (FOI) Act, and combining together all the responses.  
Our dataset is completed with information on socio-economic, labour market and 
demographic ward-level characteristics extracted from the UK Census (2001 and 
2011). All variables on employment and industrial structure are normalised by the 
number of 16-74 year old residents in ward. We use these variables to test the 
balancing properties of our setting and to study the conditioning impact of EU funds 
on the Referendum results. Our analysis also exploits data on the geographical 
distance in km of each electoral ward from the border between East Wales and West 
Wales, calculated with the ArcGIS software. Finally, the dataset is completed with the 
information on EU funds beneficiaries in Wales discussed in section 2.2. Descriptive 
statistics for all variables used in the analysis are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.  
3. Empirical design 
3.1 Identification strategy and empirical models 
The fundamental identification problem of our analysis lies in the difficulty of 
controlling for any element correlated with European policies and potentially 
influencing voting preferences. A large number of unobservable local area 
characteristics may be confounding our estimates. To get around this issue, we exploit 
the geographical distribution of Cohesion Policy support in Wales to estimate the 
effect of Cohesion Policy on the Brexit Referendum through a regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) approach. The boundary separating the Welsh area highly-funded by 
the EU (i.e. West Wales and The Valley) and a less funded area (i.e. East Wales) is used 
to define treatment and control group in a quasi-experimental setting. The analysis is 
EU funds, local opportunities, and the Brexit vote 
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performed at the level of electoral wards. Figure 2 illustrates the wards in Britain and 
their distance from the treatment border.  
From the seminal work of Holmes (1998), spatial regression discontinuity designs have 
been applied to different fields of investigation. This counterfactual method is 
particularly suitable to capture the effects of ‘spatially-targeted’ policies, as it allows 
to exploit geographical distance as a forcing variable that randomly defines treatment 
and control units (Black, 1999; Lalive, 2008; Dell, 2010; Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Gibbons 
et al., 2013; Koster et al., 2014; Giacomelli and Menon, 2016; Giua, 2017). The 
underlying idea behind the spatial RDD approach is that any characteristics must be 
smoothly distributed across the boundary, with the exception of the treatment itself 
(Black, 1999). By balancing observational units according to their distance from the 
boundary, the treatment (in our case: eligibility for the highest form of EU aid) is 
smoothly distributed across the boundary and its impact is isolated from any possible 
confounding factor, provided that assignment to the treatment cannot be manipulated. 
Our spatial forcing variable is hence the geographical distance from the regional 
border. To allow for more flexibility in our estimates, the forcing variable enters in the 
model specifications as polynomials up to the third order. In addition, following a 
consolidated practice in spatial RDD studies (Holmes, 1998; Black, 1999; Jofre 
Monseny, 2014) our specifications are based on samples made of units in the 
immediate proximity of the border. In our core specifications this entails focusing on 
(1) all wards of Wales, or (2) all wards within 50 km from the treatment border, or (3) 
all wards within 10 km from the treatment border.  
The baseline model is as follows: 
 
(1) 
Where !" is the share of Remain votes at the 2016 Referendum on Brexit in ward w; #"is the treatment variable, a dummy equal to 1 for wards belonging to the Welsh 
!" = %& + %(	#" +*+,(."), + (#")*+,(."), +0,1( 	2"0,1(  
Riccardo Crescenzi, Marco Di Cataldo, and Mara Giua 
 13 
region most targeted by EU Cohesion Policy (West Wales and The Valley) and 0 
otherwise; ."  is the forcing variable, the distance from the border in km, also 
interacted with the treatment variable. ."  enters either linearly or as a third order 
polynomial. Standard errors are clustered at the level of Local Authority8. 
Besides identifying the average treatment effect (ATE) of EU regional policy on voting 
outcomes, our analysis aims at capturing how the effect of EU transfers on 
Euroscepticism varies with the changes in the living conditions of the areas targeted 
by the policy. In particular, we estimate the effect of EU funds on voting preferences 
in presence of ‘labour market dynamism’, proxied by the reduction of unemployment 
between 2001 and 2011. The heterogeneous average treatment effect (H-ATE) model is 
estimated with the following model:  
 (2) 
Where 3" represent the socio-economic and labour market dynamism of local areas, 
to which EU regional policy is intended to contribute. All other parameters are the 
same as in model (1). The H-ATE is estimated by the interaction term between the 
treatment dummy and the continuous 3" variable. 
3.2 Balancing test 
The underlying assumption of a boundary RDD setting is the smooth distribution of 
all relevant (observable and unobservable) characteristics across the treatment border. 
We test the balancing properties of our empirical setting by checking for a correlation 
between the treatment dummy variable and a whole set of socio-economic and 
demographic variables extracted from the UK Census. The model is estimated for 
wards within 50 km from the treatment border, controlling for distance in km and 
                                                   
8 Local Authorities (LA) are local administrative units in the UK. In Wales there are 22 LAs in 
total, of which 15 are in West Wales and The Valley. The territory of LAs corresponds to that 
of electoral Constituencies. 
!" = %& + %(#"+	%43" + 	%0(#" × 3") +*+,(."), + (#")* +,(."), +0,1( 2"0,1(  
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adding polynomials of level three to assign higher weight to wards located near the 
border.  
The results of the test are reported in Table 1. For all variables we find no evidence of 
a significant difference across the border. This increases our confidence that the setting 
we have adopted fulfils the requirement for an RDD, i.e. treatment and control groups 
being equal for all relevant characteristics except for the amount of available European 
funds. Being balanced according to the geographical distance from the boundary, we 
can assume that the wards belonging to the treated and untreated regions compose an 
‘as good as random’ scenario where all characteristics are smoothly distributed among 
the two groups (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000). The wards’ difference in terms of 
electoral preferences on Brexit will be attributed to the unique factor with a 
discontinuous geographical distribution, i.e. the Cohesion Policy treatment. 
Table 1. Balancing test 
Sample: 50km from border  
Dep. var: 
Highly-
educated 
(NVQ4+) 
Log 
population 
Unempl. 
Rate 
Long-term 
unempl. 
Youth 
unempl. 
18-24 yo 
population 
Non-British 
population 
Full-time 
students 
Inactive 
population 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
West Wales 
-0.0442 0.217 0.00726 0.00369 0.0131 0.00834 -0.0133 0.00849 0.0146 
(0.0273) (0.249) (0.00550) (0.00277) (0.00993) (0.0133) (0.0155) (0.0211) (0.0160) 
Observations 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 
R-squared 0.142 0.216 0.033 0.037 0.081 0.047 0.056 0.115 0.094 
Dep var.: 
Agricultural 
employment 
Manuf. 
employment 
Empl. in 
construction 
Empl. in 
mining 
Empl. in 
public admin 
Empl. in 
wholesale 
and retail 
Empl. in 
finance 
Empl. in  
real estate 
Part-time 
employment 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
West Wales 
-0.0121 -0.00376 0.00106 0.000444 0.00337 -2.28e-06 -0.000160 0.000585 -0.00445 
(0.0140) (0.0189) (0.00350) (0.00157) (0.00532) (0.00662) (0.00364) (0.00156) (0.00628) 
Observations 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 
R-squared 0.030 0.135 0.032 0.040 0.027 0.177 0.171 0.104 0.115 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. 
West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. Sample: 
all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border, excluding wards from Cardiff. All models 
estimated with polynomials of order three interacted with forcing variable and treatment variable. 
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4. Results 
4.1 ATE and H-ATE estimates  
Table 2 provides the results of equation (1), which tests the causal link between EU 
funds in West Wales and the Referendum result. The model is specified with the 
forcing variable entering linearly or as third-order polynomial and by using different 
RDD bandwidths based on the distance from the border between East Wales and West 
Wales. The sample may be composed by all wards of Wales, or by wards within 50km 
or 10km from the border on both sides. Our preferred estimates are obtained with 
third-order polynomials of distance, following the AIC criteria.  
As shown in Table 2, in all these different specifications the coefficient of the treatment 
dummy is not statistically significant. We find no average treatment effect, or no 
evidence that Welsh wards located in the region receiving higher EU funds have voted 
comparatively more for either Remain or Leave, conditioning on the distance from the 
border. We interpret this finding as evidence that entitling citizens with more EU 
funds would not change their feelings towards Europe9.  
The visual representation of this result is illustrated in Figure 3. The observations are 
linearly fitted on the two sides of the border. The Figure displays no significant jump 
at the treatment border, confirming that, on average, people living in areas receiving 
the highest-possible level of EU financial aid have not voted differently at the Brexit 
Referendum from citizens living in much less funded areas.  
 
  
                                                   
9 This result reinforces the evidence obtained by Fidrmuc et al. (2019). By running a simple OLS analysis 
they find that EU regional development funds at NUTS2 level are not significantly associated with UK 
voters’ decisions at the Referendum on Brexit. 
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Table 2. Baseline RDD results – ATE model 
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes 
 Wales <50km <10km Wales <50km <10km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
West Wales 0.00763 -0.0319 -0.00636 -0.0127 0.00354 -0.00715 
(0.0207) (0.0191) (0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0200) (0.0175) 
Polynomial 1-1 1-1 1-1 3-3 3-3 3-3 
Observations 823 1,315 422 823 1,315 422 
R-squared 0.075 0.102 0.004 0.327 0.140 0.027 
Best polynomial degree 
(AIC) 
   
✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy 
variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. Samples: all wards of Wales 
(columns (1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards 
located 10 km or less from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models 
estimated with polynomials of order one (columns (1)-(3)) or order three (columns (4)-(6)) interacted with 
forcing variable and treatment variable. 
 
Figure 3. ATE model – RDD plot 
 
Notes: each data point represents the bin sample average for distance from treatment border, the straight 
line is a first-order polynomial in distance from border fitted separately on each side of the treatment 
boundary. Sample of Wales wards. 95% confidence intervals are shown. 
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Having established that, all in all, a higher share of EU funds alone has had no average 
effect on the Referendum’s outcome, our next step is to examine whether EU funds 
can play a role if they are combined with the economic transformation of local areas. 
In particular, we place our attention on how the local labour market has evolved in the 
period preceding the vote 10 , 11 . Territories displaying a higher local labour market 
dynamism, where socio-economic conditions have got better while EU funds have been 
flowing in, may be interpreted by citizens as a success of European policies and 
therefore produce a stronger sense of EU belonging in them, translating into more 
Remain votes. 
While pro-Europe positions may be fuelled by the perceived success of EU policies, 
the opposite can also be true. A worsening of the economic and labour performance of 
local areas targeted by Cohesion Policy may make these places more likely to vote 
against EU membership. Individuals experiencing social exclusion, job losses, or 
deprivation are more liable to develop feelings of discontent with ‘traditional’ parties. 
This is particularly true if socio-economic decline is spatially concentrated, as 
widespread disadvantage in local communities of ‘left behind’ places leads to the 
development of negative collective emotions and political discontent (Rodriguez-Pose, 
2018; Altomonte et al., 2019). In areas eligible for Structural Funds, voters may assign 
the responsibility for declining economic trajectories and for their worse living 
conditions to the failure of public policies being implemented. This would induce 
them to vote against the EU, responsible for promoting them. 
                                                   
10 As the main objective of EU regional policy is the promotion of ‘smart, sustainable and 
inclusive’ growth in recipient territories (European Commission, 2014), improvements in the 
economy and the generation of employment opportunities represent the expected outcome of 
policy interventions. 
11 In absence of GDP data at the ward level we rely on information about the unemployment 
rate, extracted from the Census. Wards are well-suited units to capture localised 
unemployment clusters. This is because most ward boundaries have been used by the UK 
Office for National Statistics to draw Output Areas (for which labour market and Referendum 
data are not available), a geographical classification of socially homogeneous areas in terms of 
household tenure and population size. 
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We calculate the change in unemployment between the two latest available Censuses, 
i.e. 2001 and 2011. As West Wales obtained the status of ‘less developed’ region from 
the EU in 2000, this variable approximates labour market conditions in the region at 
the beginning of the period of high funding, before EU funds for ‘less developed’ 
regions could produce large effects. The difference between unemployment in 2001 
and unemployment in 2011 captures the decrease in unemployment in ward w over a 10-
year period preceding the Referendum. 
As for model (1), model (2) is estimated using different bandwidths and with the 
forcing variable entering with different polynomial degrees. The results are shown in 
Table 3. First, it can be noted that, again, the West Wales dummy alone reports an 
insignificant coefficient across all specifications. The variable approximating local 
labour market dynamism, U decrease, is computed in such a way that a higher value 
corresponds to a higher reduction in the unemployment rate. This variable displays a 
significant and positive coefficient in some specifications – confirming the role of 
labour market dynamics as a driver of Euroscepticism – and it is insignificant 
otherwise. Crucially, the interaction term between the treatment dummy and the 
variable proxying labour improvements (U decrease) returns a positive and significant 
coefficient in all but one specifications. This indicates that wards within the highly-
funded West Wales where labour market conditions have most improved before the 
Referendum have been more prone to vote in favour of remaining in the EU. The 
estimated marginal effects for both West Wales and East Wales, obtained with a 10 km 
bandwidth, are displayed in Figure A1. A one percentage point reduction in 
unemployment in West Wales wards translates into approximately a 1.8pp increase in 
Remain votes, while in East Wales a similar decrease in unemployed is linked to an 
increase of around 0.5pp Remain votes, i.e. a differential of over 1 percentage point.  
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Table 3. EU funds, unemployment reduction, and Brexit – H-ATE model 
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes 
 Wales <50km <10km Wales <50km <10km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
West Wales 0.0190 -0.00556 0.00223 -0.00509 0.00895 0.00114 
(0.0207) (0.0191) (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0197) (0.0167) 
U decrease 0.430*** -0.588 0.546** 0.416*** -0.566 0.485** 
(0.132) (0.650) (0.213) (0.109) (0.636) (0.202) 
West Wales x U decrease 1.361* 1.573** 1.114* 0.587 1.559* 1.173* 
(0.770) (0.793) (0.680) (0.453) (0.812) (0.667) 
Polynomial 1-1 1-1 1-1 3-3 3-3 3-3 
Observations 802 1,057 415 802 1,057 415 
R-squared 0.181 0.191 0.139 0.374 0.209 0.154 
Best polynomial degree (AIC) 
   
✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy 
variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. U reduction: ward-level 
unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001. Samples: all wards of Wales (columns (1),(4)), all 
wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards located 10 km or less 
from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with polynomials 
of order one (columns (1)-(3)) or order three (columns (4)-(6)) interacted with forcing variable and 
treatment variable. 
 
4.2 Robustness checks  
The results in section 4.1 suggest that citizens living in areas eligible for the highest 
amount of EU Structural Funds and experiencing improvements in their local labour 
market have been more inclined to express a pro-Europe vote at the Referendum on 
Brexit. In this section, we test the robustness of this result in a number of ways. 
First, our preferred samples are obtained by excluding wards of Cardiff, for the 
reasons explained in section 2. Table A3 in the Appendix reports the results of the H-
ATE model obtained if Cardiff wards are included in the sample. Again we find that 
EU funds for ‘less developed regions’ have had no direct impact on the Referendum, 
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while financial aid from the EU is related with a higher share of Remain votes if 
combined with reductions in unemployment taking place in beneficiary areas. 
As a second test on the H-ATE results, we modify the bandwidths used to define the 
treatment and control sample. More specifically, we test the results using wards 
located within 5km, 15km, 30km, and 40km on the two sides of the treatment border. 
The results, shown in table A4 in the Appendix, confirm that the combination of high 
EU funding and improved labour conditions is significantly related to fewer 
Eurosceptic votes. 
As a third robustness test, we adopt different proxies for labour market improvements 
to interact with the treatment dummy variable. We again rely on the Census and 
compute the variation in the long-term unemployment rate and youth unemployment 
rate12 in a similar way to how the unemployment decrease variable has been created. 
That is, we calculate the difference between the variables’ latest available value 
(Census 2011) and their value when West Wales obtained the status of ‘less developed 
region’ (Census 2001). While similar to the original variable on unemployment rate, 
these indicators capture slightly different dynamics. The long-term unemployment 
change reflects the capacity of the labour market to absorb more marginalised workers, 
often socially excluded, while the variation in youth unemployment describes the 
easiness for people to find their first jobs. The results of these tests are reported in 
Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix. In all specifications the interaction terms have 
positive coefficients, most of the time statistically significant. This appears to confirm 
that the creation of labour opportunities for the most disadvantaged and for the 
youngest tends to be linked with a stronger support for EU membership in areas 
eligible for EU transfers. 
                                                   
12 Following ILO definitions, long-term unemployment rate corresponds to people seeking 
employment for one year or longer. Youth unemployment refers to unemployment of the 18-
24 year old population. 
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As a fourth test, we attempt to minimise any bias that may have been produced by 
spillovers driven by the possibility that wards from East Wales located next to the 
border have themselves being influenced by European policies. Some projects may 
have been implemented across the border, benefitting both regions, while some others 
may have attracted commuters from the Eastern side. To discard the hypothesis that 
the main results are driven by spillovers, we perform a new set of estimates, adopting 
the same sample for the treated wards, while removing all wards within 10km from 
the Eastern side of the border (Einio and Overman, 2016). The control group is then 
shifted 10km away from the border13. Due to this change in sample, the model is no 
longer estimated as a spatial RDD, i.e. assigning more weight to observations located 
near the border by means of controlling for distance. Given that balancing properties 
no longer apply to the samples, we include in the model a set of observable covariates 
as controls. We add all variables used for the balancing test reported in Table 2. By 
using this methodology we estimate both the direct impact of EU funds and the effect 
of Structural Funds in wards labour conditions have improved the most. The results 
of these estimates, illustrated in Table A7, confirm the insignificant role of EU funds 
for Brexit (columns (1)-(3)) if not combined with positive labour market dynamics 
(columns (4)-(6)). 
Finally, in one additional robustness test, we replace the West Wales treatment 
dummy with our beneficiary variables in Table A8. While this indicator only covers a 
portion of all EU money spent in Wales (approximately 60%), as shown in Table A1 
the variable correlates well with the West Wales dummy. We control again for Census 
characteristics and test the model for all Welsh wards (columns (1), (3), Table A8) and 
all Welsh wards excluding Cardiff (columns (2), (4), Table A8). When testing the 
relationship between beneficiaries of EU funds and the Brexit Referendum once again 
we find no evidence that high recipients of EU resources have voted differently from 
                                                   
13 This implies that by definition Cardiff wards are excluded from the sample, given that they 
are all located less than 10km from the treatment border. 
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less funded areas, and we also confirm that highly-funded wards in which 
unemployment has decreased more have voted Remain more. 
5. Discussion 
The evidence produced in section 4 indicates that the effect of European funds on pro-
Europe voting outcomes only materialises under certain conditions. We find that the 
dynamics of the local labour market are crucial to explain the voting preferences of 
citizens in the areas highly subsidised by the EU. This result confirms that factual 
socio-economic conditions crucially shape people’ perception of the European Union 
(Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). 
Given that creating new jobs and stemming unemployment are among the main goals 
of EU policies, citizens may view labour improvements in their local communities as 
a way for EU projects to deliver. Therefore, one interpretation of our result is that 
people who perceive or experience personal benefits from Cohesion Policy are more 
prone to appreciate the policy and their promoters. This explanation would fit within 
the economic utilitarian theory of European integration, according to which the loyalty 
to the idea of Europe depends on the perceived benefits further integration can 
provide (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel et al., 1997). 
While we cannot directly measure the extent to which the observed reduction in 
unemployment (a proxy for local economic dynamism) is directly due to EU policies, 
our findings entail that if EU projects are capable of producing strong effects on the 
local labour market – by e.g. fostering employment for the socially excluded and 
young people – this would translate into a lower level of Euroscepticism.  
The impact of EU subsidies on European attitudes, conditional on the effectiveness of 
EU policies, can be indirectly examined by looking at key elements facilitating the 
profitable use of Structural Funds. One factor increasing the local capacity to absorb 
EU transfer and obtain higher economic returns from them is the presence of highly-
educated individuals (Becker et al., 2013). The endowment of skilled workers enables 
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technology adoption (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) and the efficient management of EU 
resources (Becker et al., 2013). Therefore, we can use a proxy for the level of human 
capital in wards to check whether and how this variable relates to EU funds and 
Euroscepticism. 
We approximate the human capital stock in wards with the share of tertiary educated 
individuals, relying on 2011 Census data. First, we use this variable to test whether it 
mediates the effect of EU funds on Brexit as in the case of labour market dynamism, 
estimating a new version of the H-ATE RDD model. The results, shown in Table A9, 
demonstrate that, although a higher proportion of skilled workers directly connects 
with more Remain votes, human capital does not play a conditional effect on the link 
between EU funds and Brexit.  
However, our main interest is to verify whether the effect uncovered in section 4 (i.e. 
the generation of new employment opportunities makes EU funds positively correlate 
with a pro-Europe attitude) is stronger in places endowed with highly-educated 
people. We do so by re-estimating the H-ATE model with unemployment reduction 
as conditioning variable, similar to what we do in section 4, by splitting the sample on 
the basis of higher/lower than average human capital. The results of Table A10 indicate 
that the role of labour market dynamism as mediator of the EU funds’ effect on Brexit 
is much stronger in areas endowed with higher human capital.  
Hence, the combination of lower unemployment and higher stock of human capital 
are the two factors determining a larger effect of European funds on public support 
for the EU. In this scheme, human capital may be capturing local areas’ capacity to 
absorb EU transfers and make good use of them, as discussed above. Another 
interpretation is that it reflects the awareness of beneficiary wards over the existence of 
the policy. Previous evidence reported a strong association between the proportion of 
highly-educated people and the awareness of Cohesion Policy (Osterloh, 2011; Capello 
and Perucca, 2017). This entails that, among the regions financed by the EU through 
Cohesion Policy, those in which EU investment efforts are known more are those 
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where human capital is higher. If we follow this interpretation and apply it to our 
setting, the differential conditioning impact of unemployment decrease depending on 
the level of human capital, as shown in Table A10, is due to the fact that those being 
aware that West Wales is a region receiving financial aid from the EU are more likely 
to relate any improvements in the labour market to the effect of EU policies. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the extent to which Eurosceptic voting preferences can be 
influenced by EU policies. It leverages the case of the EU structural funds, the key EU 
policy tool targeting the economic challenges that have been linked to the world-wide 
raise of anti-system electoral preferences. The study exploits a quasi-experimental 
setting in the UK context, where some territories were classified as ‘in highest need’ of 
socio-economic support by the EU – and hence entitled to receive the highest form of 
EU funding – when the Referendum on Brexit was held. The paper investigates 
whether this ‘special’ treatment in terms of EU financial support has influenced the 
vote at the Referendum in beneficiary areas. The boundary between West Wales and 
its neighbouring region – that defines eligibility for EU financial aids - is used to 
identify ‘treated’ and ‘control’ units and uncover whether and under what conditions 
EU funding may influence electoral support for EU integration. 
Regression discontinuity estimates suggest that, all else equal, wards targeted by the 
highest proportion of EU funds have not behaved differently from less subsidised 
areas when it comes to supporting EU membership in the ballot box. Conversely, 
voters are more prone to support EU Membership if EU funding is coupled with 
tangible improvements in local labour markets. A significant decrease in the level of 
unemployment is robustly linked with fewer Eurosceptic votes in areas highly-funded 
by the European Union, vis-à-vis less well-funded territories. 
This result, robust to a full battery of robustness tests, offers (for the first time) causal 
evidence that being in receipt of EU funds does not ‘automatically’ make local citizens 
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more supportive of the European Union. Only where EU investments are combined 
with the generation of new employment opportunities and a positive socio-economic 
transformation of local territories – an explicit target of EU development policies – 
citizens are more likely to electorally support the EU as the promoter of positive 
change in their surrounding economic environment. Further empirical tests seem to 
suggest that labour market dynamism in beneficiary areas is more likely to lower 
Eurosceptic votes if citizens are more aware of EU interventions, therefore more 
directly linking positive change with EU interventions. 
These findings are in line with a growing body of evidence on economic dynamics as 
the fundamental driver of anti-establishment and Eurosceptic voting choices (Rodrik, 
2018; Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Rodriguez-Pose, 2018; Guiso et al., 2018; Dijkstra et 
al., 2019). Our findings confirm that support for the process of European integration is 
strongly influenced by economic factors, with special reference to labour market 
opportunities. What our original results add to the existing discourse is the role of 
active public policies in shaping electoral behaviour. Discomfort and resentment of EU 
citizens can indeed be mitigated and channelled towards constructive and 
internationally cooperative political options. However, what seems to matter for 
citizens is not the financial aid targeting less developed regions, but rather the 
capability of these funds to concretely mitigate the lack of economic opportunities. 
Areas most heavily funded by the EU tend to develop a more favourable view of 
Europe if (and only if) citizens observe visible socio-economic improvements in their 
local communities with potential personal benefits from EU intervention. In this 
perspective, future support for the process of European integration is highly 
dependent on the capacity of all EU policies to deliver concrete benefits to be felt at 
the local level. Impactful policies are therefore a fundamental tool to buy-in citizens 
from less developed regions into the EU project. Money cannot buy love (for the EU), 
but impact and positive transformation certainly can.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. EU funds per inhabitant in West Wales (beneficiary data) 
Dep. var.: EU funds per inhabitant 
  Wales <50km <10km 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
West Wales 542.0*** 550.0*** 372.2** 
 (103.7) (122.1) (159.0) 
Observations 823 1,315 422 
R-squared 0.007 0.013 0.007 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EU 
funds per inhabitant as dependent variable, calculated on the basis of available beneficiary data. West 
Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. Cardiff wards 
excluded. 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics 
 Cardiff wards excluded 
 Wales <50km  <10km  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Share of Remain 
votesa 823 0.47 0.05 1,315 0.47 0.06 422 0.447 0.037 
West Wales 824 0.681 0.466 1,315 0.354 0.479 422 0.590 0.492 
€ of EU funds 
(beneficiaries)a 823 398.2 3047 1,315 219.0 2344 422 387.2 5052 
Unemployment 
decreaseb 803 -0.006 0.012 1,057 -0.008 0.012 415 -0.009 0.010 
Long-term 
unemployment 
decreaseb 
803 -0.005 0.007 1,057 -0.006 0.007 415 -0.007 0.006 
Youth 
unemployment 
decreaseb 
803 -0.015 0.030 1,057 -0.016 0.027 415 -0.019 0.028 
Log population 824 7.920 0.557 1,315 8.293 0.693 422 8.032 0.570 
Highly-educated (NVQ4+)a 824 0.244 0.084 1,315 0.257 0.092 422 0.239 0.087 
Unemployment  824 0.041 0.020 1,315 0.041 0.020 422 0.042 0.017 
Long-term 
unemploymentb 824 0.016 0.009 1,315 0.016 0.009 422 0.017 0.008 
Youth 
unemploymentb 824 0.085 0.037 1,315 0.079 0.036 422 0.090 0.035 
18-24 yo 
populationa 824 0.139 0.067 1,315 0.141 0.070 422 0.135 0.042 
Non-British 
populationa 824 0.046 0.042 1,315 0.057 0.058 422 0.043 0.045 
Full-time studentsa 824 0.020 0.020 1,315 0.022 0.020 422 0.019 0.012 
Inactive 
populationa 824 0.350 0.082 1,315 0.345 0.080 422 0.341 0.054 
Agricultural 
employmentb 824 0.020 0.031 1,315 0.017 0.029 422 0.015 0.029 
Manufacturing 
employmentb 824 0.067 0.033 1,315 0.072 0.033 422 0.078 0.031 
Employment in 
constructionb 824 0.055 0.014 1,315 0.055 0.017 422 0.053 0.011 
Employment in 
miningb 824 0.002 0.003 1,315 0.002 0.002 422 0.002 0.003 
Employment in 
public adminb 824 0.047 0.021 1,315 0.046 0.020 422 0.047 0.019 
Employment in 
wholesale and 
retailb 
824 0.096 0.024 1,315 0.106 0.030 422 0.091 0.017 
Employment in 
financeb 824 0.015 0.009 1,315 0.021 0.014 422 0.017 0.009 
Employment in 
real estateb 824 0.008 0.003 1,315 0.009 0.004 422 0.008 0.003 
Part-time 
employmentb 824 0.146 0.029 1,315 0.154 0.036 422 0.140 0.017 
a: calculated as share of ward residents; b: calculated as share of 16-74 year old residents.   
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Figure A1. H-ATE – estimated marginal effects 
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Table A3. EU funds, unemployment reduction, and Brexit (Cardiff wards included) 
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes 
 Wales <50km <10km Wales <50km <10km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
West Wales -0.00051 -0.0220 -0.0173 -0.0264 -0.0174 -0.0112 
(0.0275) (0.0243) (0.0237) (0.0257) (0.0298) (0.0208) 
U decrease -0.377 -0.814 -0.671 -0.397 -0.819 -0.596 
(0.720) (0.611) (1.043) (0.715) (0.621) (0.893) 
West Wales x U 
decrease 
1.912* 1.799** 2.331* 1.399* 1.812** 2.255** 
(1.045) (0.761) (1.226) (0.840) (0.800) (1.096) 
Polynomial 1-1 1-1 1-1 3-3 3-3 3-3 
Observations 831 1,086 444 831 1,086 444 
R-squared 0.129 0.165 0.131 0.282 0.178 0.147 
Best polynomial 
degree (AIC) 
   
✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy 
variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. U reduction: ward-level 
unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001. Samples: all wards of Wales (columns (1),(4)), all 
wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards located 10 km or less 
from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with polynomials 
of order one (columns (1)-(3)) or order three (columns (4)-(6)) interacted with forcing variable and 
treatment variable. 
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Table A4. EU funds, unemployment reduction, and Brexit (varying bandwidths) 
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes 
 <5km <15km <30km <40km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
West Wales 0.00192 -0.00249 0.00773 0.00453 
(0.0161) (0.0163) (0.0176) (0.0179) 
U decrease 0.343 0.559*** -0.381 -0.859 
(0.392) (0.184) (0.430) (0.549) 
West Wales x U decrease 1.499* 1.066* 1.389** 1.869** 
(0.811) (0.629) (0.663) (0.769) 
Polynomial 3-3 3-3 3-3 3-3 
Observations 261 517 740 897 
R-squared 0.235 0.183 0.184 0.150 
Best polynomial degree (AIC) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy 
variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. U reduction: ward-level 
unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001. Samples: all wards located 5 km or less from the 
treatment border (column (1)), all wards located 15 km or less from the treatment border (column (2)), all 
wards located 30 km or less from the treatment border (column (3)), all wards located 40 km or less from 
the treatment border (column (4)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with polynomials of order 
three interacted with forcing variable and treatment variable. 
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Table A5. EU funds, long-term unemployment reduction, and Brexit 
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes 
 Wales <50km <10km Wales <50km <10km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
West Wales 0.0244 -0.00056 0.000501 -0.00041 0.0134 -0.00058 
(0.0211) (0.0188) (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0188) (0.0175) 
LTU decrease 1.172** -0.367 1.682*** 1.134** -0.294 1.640*** 
(0.521) (1.078) (0.563) (0.430) (1.080) (0.565) 
West Wales x LTU decrease 2.201* 2.552** 0.818 1.211 2.454* 0.812 
(1.300) (1.262) (1.201) (0.814) (1.312) (1.195) 
Polynomial 1-1 1-1 1-1 3-3 3-3 3-3 
Observations 802 1,057 415 802 1,057 415 
R-squared 0.220 0.192 0.152 0.398 0.209 0.161 
Best polynomial degree (AIC) 
   
✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy 
variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. LTU decrease: ward-level 
long-term unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001. Samples: all wards of Wales (columns 
(1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards located 10 
km or less from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with 
polynomials of order one (columns (1)-(3)) or order three (columns (4)-(6)) interacted with forcing variable 
and treatment variable. 
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Table A6. EU funds, youth unemployment reduction, and Brexit 
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes 
 Wales <50km <10km Wales <50km <10km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
West Wales 0.0154 -0.0148 -0.00174 -0.00735 0.00315 -0.00167 
(0.0223) (0.0189) (0.0169) (0.0174) (0.0191) (0.0178) 
Youth U decrease 0.164 0.188 0.0460 0.306 0.172 -0.0366 
(0.602) (1.287) (0.535) (0.473) (1.208) (0.483) 
West Wales x Youth U 
decrease 
2.214* 1.320 1.818* 1.279* 1.384 1.922* 
(1.115) (1.417) (1.060) (0.733) (1.385) (1.007) 
Polynomial 1-1 1-1 1-1 3-3 3-3 3-3 
Observations 802 1,057 415 802 1,057 415 
R-squared 0.120 0.170 0.040 0.351 0.190 0.060 
Best polynomial degree (AIC)    ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy 
variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. Youth U reduction: ward-
level 16-24 yo unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001. Samples: all wards of Wales 
(columns (1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards 
located 10 km or less from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models 
estimated with polynomials of order one (columns (1)-(3)) or order three (columns (4)-(6)) interacted with 
forcing variable and treatment variable. 
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Table A7. Test for spillover effects 
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes 
 Wales 
<50km 
(West Wales) 
 
10-50km 
(East Wales) 
<10km 
(West Wales) 
 
10-20km  
East Wales) 
Wales 
<50km 
(West Wales) 
 
10-50km 
(East Wales) 
<10km 
(West Wales) 
 
10-20km 
(East Wales) 
 Control wards < 10km from border excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
West Wales -0.00190 0.0265 -0.0104 -
0.000430 
0.0275 -0.00177 
(0.0222) (0.0190) (0.0140) (0.0219) (0.0184) (0.0134) 
U reduction    0.272 -0.0356 -0.553 
   (0.437) (0.479) (0.433) 
West Wales x 
U decrease 
   1.382*** 0.832** 1.147** 
   (0.372) (0.390) (0.492) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 693 947 551 388 642 168 
R-squared 0.262 0.459 0.404 0.315 0.427 0.604 
 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy 
variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. Samples: all wards of Wales 
excluding East Wales wards less than 10km from border (columns (1), (4)), all West Wales wards located 
50 km or less from the treatment border and East Wales wards between 10 and 50km from treatment 
border (columns (2), (5)), all West Wales wards located 10 km or less from the treatment border and East 
Wales wards between 10 and 20km from border (columns (3), (6)). Controls refer to labour market and 
demographic ward characteristics taken from the Census.  
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Table A8. EU funds beneficiaries, unemployment reduction, and Brexit 
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes 
  Cardiff wards excluded 
 Cardiff wards 
excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU funds beneficiaries 
1.80e-07 1.28e-07 6.84e-07* 5.56e-07 
(3.85e-07) (5.28e-07) (2.90e-07) (4.26e-07) 
U decrease 
  0.692 1.120 
  (0.847) (0.708) 
EU funds beneficiaries x U 
decrease 
  0.000147** 0.000131* 
  (5.90e-05) (6.60e-05) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 852 823 831 802 
R-squared 0.423 0.383 0.445 0.415 
 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Samples: all Wales wards (columns (1), (3)), all Wales wards excluding wards from Cardiff (columns (2), 
(4)). Controls refer to labour market and demographic ward characteristics taken from the Census.  
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Table A9. EU funds, human capital, and Brexit 
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes 
 Wales <50km <10km Wales <50km <10km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
West Wales -0.00348 -0.0161 -0.0158 -0.00703 -0.00047 -0.0220 
(0.0239) (0.0255) (0.0251) (0.0224) (0.0303) (0.0235) 
Tertiary educated 0.118** 0.217*** 0.148*** 0.133*** 0.225*** 0.146*** 
(0.0421) (0.0719) (0.0461) (0.0343) (0.0724) (0.0469) 
West Wales x Tertiary 
educated 
0.0890 0.0260 0.0683 0.0321 0.0357 0.0643 
(0.0634) (0.0738) (0.0962) (0.0525) (0.0776) (0.0926) 
Polynomial 1-1 1-1 1-1 3-3 3-3 3-3 
Observations 802 1,057 415 802 1,057 415 
R-squared 0.230 0.260 0.251 0.416 0.287 0.257 
Best polynomial degree 
(AIC) 
   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy 
variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. Tertiary educated: 2011 
ward population holding NVQ level 4 or above. Samples: all wards of Wales (columns (1),(4)), all wards 
located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards located 10 km or less from 
the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with polynomials of 
order one (columns (1)-(3)) or order three (columns (4)-(6)) interacted with forcing variable and treatment 
variable. 
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Table A10. EU funds, unemployment reduction, and Brexit – results by level of human 
capital 
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes 
 
Human capital below median 
(less than 26% holding tertiary 
education degree) 
Human capital above median 
(more than 26% holding tertiary 
education degree) 
 Wales <50km <10km Wales <50km <10km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
West Wales 0.00062 0.0178 -0.0084 0.0154 0.0244 0.0212 
(0.0193) (0.0219) (0.0170) (0.0153) (0.0210) (0.0167) 
U decrease 0.298 0.722 0.0912 0.341 1.123 0.326 
(0.244) (0.645) (0.269) (0.239) (0.931) (0.305) 
West Wales x U 
decrease 
0.346 1.426** 1.010 2.094*** 2.541* 2.247* 
(0.418) (0.689) (0.587) (0.453) (1.381) (1.301) 
Polynomial 3-3 3-3 3-3 3-3 3-3 3-3 
Observations 521 650 278 281 407 137 
R-squared 0.282 0.178 0.139 0.374 0.209 0.217 
Best polynomial 
degree (AIC) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Notes: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy 
variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. U decrease: ward-level 
unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001. Samples: all wards of Wales (columns (1),(4)), all 
wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards located 10 km or less 
from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with polynomials 
of order one (columns (1)-(3)) or order three (columns (4)-(6)) interacted with forcing variable and 
treatment variable. 
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